argument against the majority's opinion, Justice Scalia makes observations about the religious affiliation of the Justices ("[n]ot a single Evangelical Christian . . . or even a Protestant of any denomination") 18 and criticizes Justice Kennedy's writing style (noting that he would "hide my head in a bag" if "even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote" he joined an opinion containing the Court's rhetoric.
)
It is hard to know how one should treat this outburst. The sad fact is that Justice Scalia has become a caricature of his earlier self. He embarrasses even many of his ideological friends. Perhaps the discreet and humane thing to do is to ignore him. The problem is that it is not easy to ignore one of the nine people making constitutional policy for the country, and constitutional pundits rarely make the effort. Instead, people who should know better routinely praise Justice Scalia for his brilliance, integrity, and scintillating writing style. It therefore seems necessary to point out that in recent years he has made a habit of substituting vitriol for anything resembling reasoned analysis.
When they are on their best behavior, Supreme Court justices exhibit generosity of spirit, tolerance of disagreement, and respect for their intellectual opponents. It has been a long time since 12 135 S. Ct. at ___ (Scalia, J., dissenting). 13 Id. at ___. 14 Id. at ___. 15 Id. at ___. 16 Id. at ___. 17 Id. at ___. 18 Id. at ___. In fairness, the statement is made to demonstrate that the Court lacks diversity, and Justice Scalia makes clear that lack of diversity would not matter if the Court were merely interpreting the law; he claims that it is not Still, the argument makes sense only if he is asserting that the majority's decision is influenced by the religious beliefs of the justices-an extraordinary charge that is supported by no evidence. For whatever it is worth, two of the five justices in the majority have self-identified as Roman Catholics, and the Catholic Church has been a steadfast opponent of same-sex marriage. 19 Id. at ___ private schooling, 26 and family living arrangements. 27 Justice Thomas is nothing if not consistent. He seems to have a more-or-less worked out theory, applied over a wide range of cases, for why virtually all of modern constitutional law has gone off track. Still, one must ask: who is the real radical on the Supreme Court? 20 See, e.g., id. at ___ (Roberts,C. J. dissenting); id. at ___ (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at ___ (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at ___ (Alito, J., dissenting). 21 Id. at ___. 22 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 330 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that the free exercise clause was applicable to the states through the liberty protections of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause). 23 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that interest in continued employment was part of liberty entitled to procedural protection under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause). 24 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that right of married person to contraception is guaranteed against state infringement by liberty provision in due process clause of fourteenth amendment). 25 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. `113 (1973) (holding that abortion right is guaranteed against state infringement by liberty provision in due process clause of fourteenth amendment). 26 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that state statute prohibiting private education violated liberty provision of fourteenth amendment). 27 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.494 (1977) (holding that municipal ordinance restricting occupancy in any dwelling to members of the same, narrowly defined family violated liberty provision of fourteenth amendment).
Perhaps it would make sense to dispose of all these decisions if Justice Thomas's rival theory were coherent and attractive. But it does not. Justice Thomas claims that this killing field for precedent is required by the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment. Even on the flawed assumption that unadulterated originalism is either an important part of our constitutional tradition or an attractive methodology, it is hard to reconcile it with Thomas's defense elsewhere in his opinion of natural law as a check on unjust positive law.
The tension is most apparent when Thomas turns to his criticism of the majority for relying upon human dignity. Citing the Declaration of Independence, Thomas complains that the majority undermines a key premise of the natural law tradition -that "dignity is innate and [does not come] from the Government." 28 As Thomas puts the point:
Slaves did not lose their dignity . . . because the government allowed them to be enslaved. Those held in internment camps did not lose their dignity because the government confined them. And those denied governmental benefits certainly do not lose their dignity because the government denies them benefits. The government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it away.
29
These jurisprudential musings are deeply confused. Of course, there is nothing confused about the claim that that human dignity and rights are prepolitical. That claim is at the center of an honorable and venerable natural law tradition that has played an important role in our constitutional history. But no one identified with that tradition, including presumably Justice Thomas, would claim that because government cannot deprive people of their intrinsic dignity, we should therefore defer to political decisions that are inconsistent with dignity.
If the government enforced slavery or established internment camps, would Justice Thomas really give it a free pass on the theory that these actions could not and did not take away human dignity? Perhaps he would if there were no constitutional text that governed the practice, but then one 28 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. ___, ___(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at ___.
must ask who is it whose theory is not attendant to human dignity? The more conventional understanding of the natural law tradition is that claims to dignity give courts a place to stand when they invalidate government decisions that are inconsistent with human dignity.
Precisely because the government cannot grant or take away human dignity -precisely because dignity is prepolitical -political institutions cannot redefine dignity to suit their purposes. Invocations of majoritarianism, judicial restraint, and respect for different views also lie at the heart of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, the most extensive and carefully reasoned of the four dissents.
The opinion nonetheless overflows with ironies and contradictions. Perhaps the most disturbing is his analogy between the majority's decision and the Court's decision upholding slavery in Dred Scott v.
Sandford. 37 The comparison will strike many as morally obtuse. Put simply, requiring states to permit free individuals to choose gay marriage is nothing like allowing states to enslave African Americans.
Indeed, among the many fundamental rights denied to slaves was the right to marry and form families.
How can the Chief Justice invoke a decision that cruelly withheld the right to marry to criticize a decision that grants the right?
There is a second reason why the Chief Justice Roberts' Dred Scott analogy fails. Unlike the majority opinion in Obergefell, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott did not purport to rest on controversial claims about human flourishing. On the contrary, Taney insisted that it was "not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-making power."
38
In the most notorious passage in his opinion, Taney referred to African Americans as " beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights to which the white man was bound to respect." The first problem with this criticism, at least as applied to Obergefell, is that it misrepresents the obstacle to a political resolution of the marriage problem. In fact, it is Chief Justice Roberts and his dissenting colleagues who are out of step with a large and growing majority that favors gay marriage. bakery owners and bakery workers because of the controversial view that working more than ten hours per day was harmful and wrong. Similarly, the states that outlawed state-sanctioned gay marriage adopted a particular view of marriage that was not universally shared and imposed it on everyone. It was not the Lochner and Obergefell majorities that were forcing everyone to adhere to a uniform view.
The decisions forced no one to work for more than ten hours or to marry a partner of the same sex.
Instead, it left the decision to individuals.
Viewed in this way, it becomes clear that Chief Justice Roberts' criticism of Lochner and
Obergefell not only has things backward; it also rests on a non sequitur. The argument starts with the accurate premise that people disagree with about maximum hours legislation and gay marriage, but then jumps to the fallacious conclusion that therefore the disagreement should be settled for everyone by majoritarian institutions. To see that the conclusion does not follow from the premise, we need only transfer the argument to a different sphere. No one says that because people disagree about the nature of God, therefore, the United States should use democratic processes to adopt a uniform religion for everyone. On the contrary, in at least this setting, disagreement about religion leads to the conclusion that people should be free to decide for themselves what they think about God.
The real dispute, then, is not between courts on the one hand and political institutions on the other, but between public decisions that bind everyone and private decisions that permit individual choice. People who believe, as Chief Justice Roberts claims to, that everyone should not be forced to accept a particular, controversial conception of marriage should embrace rather than oppose Obergefell.
Of course, it does not follow that people should believe that the marriage question ought to be resolved privately rather than publicly. The choice between public and private resolution rests on the answers to controversial questions about issues like the appropriate role for constitutional text, whether the Constitution establishes a presumption in favor of individual or political choice, the extent of externalities produced by individual decisions, the extent to which these decisions are truly "free," and whether paternalism is a legitimate basis for collective action. Although the Obergefell Court is not deciding for everyone how "marriage" should be conceived, it is implicitly resolving at least some of these issues.
Making the right choice between public and private is a problem, alright, but it is at this point that Chief Justice Roberts misconceives the solution. He and the other dissenters insist that the solution is to remit all questions to majority rule unless the Constitution leaves them to individuals. On this view, the Court should remain aloof from the battle between the contending forces. It should enforce only constitutional judgments, not its own. Unfortunately, though, this sort of neutrality is a logical impossibility at least if one accepts the starting premises of our constitutional tradition.
To understand why this is so, we need to examine the microstructure of the plaintiffs' argument in Obergefell. Although the majority focused primarily on the plaintiffs' due process argument, the point is easiest to see with regard to their equal protection claim. That claim can be reduced to a simple assertion: The government has left decisions forming heterosexual unions to individual, private action; it treats gay men and lesbians unequally when it forces them to accept a collective, public decision about their unions.
The claim is plausible, but only if gay marriages are relevantly the same as straight marriages.
The equal protection clause requires that likes be treated alike, but when two things are not alike, it violates rather than vindicates equality to treat them in the same way. Are gay and straight marriages relevantly alike? All of the hard work must be done by defining the word "relevantly." Gay and straight marriages are both alike and unalike along an infinite number of dimensions. The key point is that it is impossible to decide which dimensions are relevant without making a contestable moral judgment about the institution of marriage. Justice Alito's dissent makes the point with startling clarity. He apparently concedes, at least arguendo, that on a "consent-based" conception of marriage, gay men and lesbians have a legitimate claim to marriage, but, he insists, their claim is much less powerful on a "conjugal" conception of marriage.
52 Suppose we put aside questions about whether the "conjugal" conception really justifies our rules about heterosexual marriage and really rules out homosexual marriage. 53 Whether or not he has the right categories, Alito is certainly right that we cannot resolve issues about whether heterosexual and homosexual marriage are the same without making a judgment about what marriage is for.
But what follows from this observation? It emphatically does not follow that heterosexual marriage is for the private sphere while homosexual marriage is for the public sphere. The equal protection clause requires that likes be treated alike, so a Court that reached this conclusion would have to believe that gay and straight marriage are not alike. It would have to embrace the "conjugal" conception (or some other conception that distinguished between the two forms of marriage) as the right one. But embracing that conception would violate the neutrality that the dissenters insist upon.
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In many cases, the Court resolves this problem by paying substantial deference to the political branches on questions of sameness and difference. With regard to "ordinary social and economic legislation," the Court sometimes asks only whether the legislature was "rational," although more exacting scrutiny is required for other sorts of classifications. 55 The dissenters present no argument why 52 See id. at ___ (Alito, J., dissenting).
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The argument for these propositions must deal with the obvious facts that many people in heterosexual marriages do not raise children and many people in homosexual marriages do. 54 We might be closer to a neutral regime if we completely privatized marriage. One could imagine a regime where anyone could marry anyone else without state involvement of any kind. Even this radical reform could not escape state involvement, however. State and federal governments would still need to decide which marriages were eligible for the various benefits and obligations that attach to marital status. 55 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) ("legislative classifications are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the State's obectives"); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, mere rationality should be sufficient in this case, and there is strong reason to believe that the choice of level of scrutiny is, itself, the result of contestable moral and political views. For example, Chief Justice Roberts thinks that affirmative action measures should be viewed with suspicion because "divvying us up by race" is a "sordid business" 56 that is "pernicious," 57 and "odious to a free people." 58 Justice
Thomas has reached a similar conclusion because of his belief that African Americans can succeed without it. 59 If these justices thought that discrimination against gay men and lesbians were similarly problematic, they would presumably utilize the same level of scrutiny.
Moreover, even when scrutiny is minimal, the justices do not altogether forego enforcement. It follows that even if the dissenters were to apply rational basis review, they would have to decide whether a particular conception of marriage was "rational." For example, the dissenters would almost certainly invalidate a statute that prevented couples unable to conceive a child or from different ethnic or economic groups from marrying. But that holding, like the holding in Obergefell, requires a moral judgment about the appropriate nature of marriage.
The Court might avoid moral judgment if it completely forewent enforcement. There is much to be said for this approach, and some who have said it. It seems improbable to say the least, but perhaps Chief Justice Roberts and his dissenting colleagues wish to join the small but growing chorus of rebels opposing the orthodoxy of constitutional obligation and Supreme Court supremacy. 60 What seems more likely is that the dissenters' distaste for gay marriage leads them to make an exception to the conventional rules of American constitutionalism for this case. Obviously, such an exception is also inconsistent with the dissenters' insistence on neutrality in our culture wars.
There is still another reason why judicial deference does not solve the underlying problem.
Deference to the political branches should not be confused with the view that constitutional commands should simply be ignored. When the Court defers, it assumes that constitutional commands will be enforced legislative and executive officials. Of course, few believe that political officials actually take seriously their supposed obligation to obey the Constitution, at least in this context. If that is the outcome that the dissenters favor, then we should not take seriously their rhetoric about adherence to constitutional limits. In that event, the Constitution would, indeed, have "nothing to do with it."
II.
"Celebrate the Constitution"? It will not do, then, to claim that the Constitution has "nothing to do" with Obergefell. It has everything to do with it. Neither does it follow, though, that we should celebrate either the Constitution or Obergefell's embrace of our constitutional tradition.
Obergefell, like scores of other constitutional decisions, rests on a syllogism the structure of which is as fallacious as it is familiar:
Major Premise: We have a duty to adhere to the commands of the Constitution.
Minor Premise: The Constitution commands X.
Conclusion: At least until the Constitution is changed, we have a duty to do X.
The truth of the major premise rests on the belief that properly understood, the Constitution provides a just basis for resolving disputes among people who would otherwise disagree. The truth of the minor premise rests on the belief that we can discern the meaning of the Constitution without presupposing an extra-constitutional resolution of that disagreement. Because both of these beliefs are false, the conclusion does not follow. It follows that people who say that we should obey the Constitution because of the good outcomes it produces are actually insisting that others obey, not that they themselves should obey.
Their own obedience is conditional on the command producing results that they favor, yet they want others to obey even though it produces the wrong result from their point of view. It is, an uphill climb to say the least to explain why others should have an obligation from which the person insisting on the obligation exempts herself.
To test the first premise, then, we have to imagine a constitutional command is clear and that it commands something that we would otherwise strongly oppose. For most readers of this article, the test requires turning the Court's holding in Obergefell inside out. Imagine, then, that provisions in the Constitution, written over two hundred years ago, unambiguously commanded that gay people should not be allowed to marry. Imagine as well (actually imagination is unnecessary here) that the mechanisms for changing the constitutional command are so cumbersome as to be virtually useless.
Does this command, standing by itself, provide a just basis for resolution of the dispute about gay marriage? Does it provide a good reason why people who favor gay marriage should change their minds and now oppose efforts (short of constitutional amendment) to implement it?
I have written a book and several articles about why I think the answers to these questions are "no." 61 Nothing would be gained by repeating all those arguments here. Suffice it to say that it is far from self-evident that a document written by others containing a noxious command that, as a practical matter, cannot be changed should definitively resolve a dispute about whether the command should be obeyed.
Nor does it solve the problem to argue that even if this command is noxious, the Constitution does more good than evil. That argument still rests on a claim that, overall and all things considered,
the Constitution commands what the person making the argument thinks of as the right result and would favor even if there were not a constitution. Put differently, the command is doing no work for the person making the argument, even though that person insists that it should do work for others.
Matters are made much worse because the belief underlying the second premise is also false. If the command is, in fact, contained in the Constitution, then the many people who are unconvinced by my arguments will think that we must obey it. But for reasons that I have already set out, 62 and straight marriage are relevantly similar. More broadly, it is simply not possible to give determinate content to commands like "don't deny equal protection" or "provide due process" without first resolving the very moral and political controversy that the Constitution is supposed to settle.
Because I have done so elsewhere, I won't bore readers with elaborate argumentation supporting this proposition either. Instead, in what follows, I explore some of the pernicious consequences that flow from this failed logic.
The first and, perhaps most serious consequence is that disputants forced into a procrustean mold of constitutional argument end up alienated from their own, deeply held positions. Consider in this regard the plight of opponents of gay marriage. At least in its most defensible form, their opposition is rooted in a simple argument: There is no right to gay marriage because it is immoral, inconsistent with human flourishing, degrading, and unnatural. 63 To be clear, I have no sympathy for this argument. I think that it is question-begging, unconvincing, and, indeed, barely comprehensible. Still, it is a view honestly held by millions of Americans, and it is at the center of the debate about same-sex marriage.
What happens to this argument when it gets fed into our constitutional law machine? Recall that the major premise rests on the position that constitutional law provides a just basis for resolving disputes among people who would otherwise disagree. Perhaps that position could be sustained if it were shown that the Constitution was somehow neutral as between rival views. As we have already seen, though, there is no way to supply the content of the "X" in the minor premise without taking a position on the very issue in dispute. To make the syllogism plausible, then, a court must demonstrate that it has come to X through the use of presuppositions that are very widely shared.
The chief such presupposition concerns means-ends rationality. Because we disagree about many ends and because this disagreement threatens the unanimity that the major premise requires, we The condemnation [of homosexuality] has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.
them, gay marriage opponents were left with no alternative but to make substitute arguments that, not surprisingly, ill-fit the position they were defending.
There is little mystery about why the Supreme Court disallowed the morality argument. It is, at best, controversial, and the prospect of resolving the controversy by resort to presuppositions that are widely shared is nil. And so, in order to preserve the first premise, courts ignore the argument and replace it with another argument about rational means to an uncontroversial end. Judge Posner then gets to make fun of the litigants for defending a means that any intelligent person would see is completely disconnected from the posited end. Often, this display is coupled with dark hints that this disconnect demonstrates lack of good faith and candor. Perhaps the litigants are merely stupid, but if we assume that they are intelligent, then their seeming irrationality must be caused by the effort to advance some secret end that they are not revealing.
Playing this game is no doubt satisfying to the winners and demonstrates their intellectual and moral superiority, at least to their own satisfaction. The problem, though, is that the game is rigged.
One can always win an argument if one starts by disqualifying the principal position of one's opponent.
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It will not do to claim that moral arguments in general cannot justify laws. All laws have moral substrates. The Court remains blind to this fact in the same way that many white people think that they have no race. Requirements imposed by means/ends rationality, the harm principle, and welfare maximization themselves rest on moral presuppositions that the Court treats as neutral and "just there" only because they are familiar to the justices. If one starts instead with a different set of premises, the 70 The phenomenon extends beyond the gay marriage debate and has become an important feature of constitutional law. For example, advocates of affirmative action are forced to make sometimes unconvincing arguments about diversity because the Supreme Court has taken the aim of ending racial subjugation off the table. Similarly, advocates of campaign finance regulation must make sometimes unconvincing arguments about quidpro-quo corruption because the Supreme Court has taken the aim of equalizing political power without regard to wealth off the table. For my argument that substitution is a defining characteristic of constitutional law, see Louis Michael Seidman Substitute Arguments in Constitutional Law (forthcoming).
wrongness of gay relations might be "just there," and then the prohibition of gay marriage would be a completely rational means that uncontroversially advances the end of discouraging immoral behavior.
All this is sufficiently obvious that there is a risk that the sham will be seen for what it is. For this reason, the basic moves of the game need to be supplemented with other rhetorical tropes. At this point, a second pernicious consequence of constitutional argument emerges. In order to make the argument plausible, the losing position must be painted as not only wrong, but also outside the bounds of reasonable discourse. The winning position, in turn, must be painted as not only right but also uncontroversial, and to make it uncontroversial, it must be distinguished from other positions that might raise problems.
That effort, in turn, gives the new recognition of constitutionally protected groups a curious, double-edged quality. Even as the Supreme Court extends the bounds of empathy and connection to the previously excluded, it frequently does so against the backdrop of other disfavored groups that are left all the more isolated.
There is a history to this. When the first Justice Harlan wrote his celebrated dissent in Plessy v. Who are the disfavored groups victimized by Obergefell? The most obvious candidates are religious and cultural conservatives. In fairness to the majority, it goes out of its way to express respect for these groups. There is, moreover, a difference between merely losing and being effectively excluded from the political community. Still, a necessary consequence of resting the decision on the duty to obey constitutional commands is that people on the other side are painted as not just wrong but as opposing the fundamental commitments under which our society is organized. Yes, "[m]any who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises" 76 but that does not change the fact that their position is not just wrong, but denies "the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment." At the beginning of the opinion, we learn that "marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations," 78 apparently leaving the unmarried hopeless and without aspirations (at least of the profound variety). At the end, we are told that gay people must be allowed to marry so as "not to be condemned to live in loneliness" 79 as if unmarried people necessarily lack human connection and companionship. The valorization of marriage and attack on the unmarried is also deeply reactionary. It comes at a moment when, as just noted, a huge percentage of marriages end in divorce -often acrimonious and wrenching --and when fewer and fewer Americans are choosing marriage in the first place. 90 This lack of empathy and understanding for a choice that many make and a necessity that many face is especially incongruous in an opinion that purports to argue for inclusion and understanding. The majority is on firm ground when it points to the human misery caused by insisting on a limited number of social scripts to which people must conform whether or not it suits their circumstances. It is therefore especially unfortunate that the very opinion that lauds the virtues of inclusion and respect also thoughtlessly attacks a central feature in the lives of so many.
Ironically, the majority's characterization of the unmarried also oversimplifies the experience of the gay Americans it purports to defend. The opinion effectively reads out of the gay rights movement those who advanced a radical critique of mainstream sexual mores. Moreover, from reading the opinion, one might suppose that before rescued by a beneficent Court, gay men and lesbians were "outcast[s]" 91 condemned to a lonely existence without hope or aspiration. Of course, no one should deny the history of oppression, violence, and exclusion suffered by the gay community. But gay people, like other oppressed minorities, managed to develop a sustaining culture in the face of that oppression.
Part of what made the culture sustaining was that it stood in opposition to the majority culture.
Contrary to the implication of the majority opinion, all gay people were not isolated and miserable.
They formed communities, had fun, lived productive lives, and gained sustenance from their association Occasionally, the Supreme Court has utilized the equal protection clause to mandate collective, positive rights, but the dissenting justices are correct when they insist that this is not the dominant strain of American constitutionalism. The majority therefore needed to shield itself from the claim that it was embracing this strain. It did so by recasting the problem for gay Americans as the frustration of an individual choice to marry that was part of the "liberty" that the due process clause protects.
That is part of the problem faced by gay Americans, but it is nothing like the whole problem. As
Chief Justice Roberts points out, individual people face all sorts of restrictions on marital choice, including, most prominently, the restriction on polygamy. 99 The majority provides no answer to the Chief Justice's complaint that its opinion opens the door to constitutional protection for polygamists. To provide an answer, the majority would have had to acknowledge the public, group nature of the claim to gay marriage.
That claim is not premised solely on the frustration of individual choice (a characteristic it shares with polygamy), but on the fact that restrictions on gay marriage are part of a system of laws, practices, customs, and beliefs that subjugate gay men and lesbians as a group in a way that individuals who want more than one spouse are not subjugated. People who would like to be married to more than one spouse are not routinely beaten up, ridiculed, despised, and excluded from employment or public accommodations. 100 Nor are they part of a group formed by genetic or at least very deeply rooted characteristics that go to the core of their identity and that are not subject to change. The difference is significant now, but was less so when polygamy was associated with the Church of the Latter Day Saints, which was a group and suffered from oppression. Today, people who wish to marry more than one spouse find their choice frustrated, but they do not suffer widespread discrimination, violence, subjugation, or Moreover, the solution to the problem involves much more than just recognizing the right of gay men and lesbians to be "let alone." As Chief Justice Roberts rightly points out, bans on gay marriage create no crime and impose no punishment. Same-sex couples remain free to live together, to engage in intimate conduct, to raise their families as they see fit. . . . [T]he laws in no way interfere with the "right to be let alone." 101 After years of official oppression, a commitment by government to leave gay men and lesbians in peace is no doubt an advance. But it is far from all that is required. Much of the most serious oppression of gay Americans stems from private violence, hatred, and discrimination. To ward that off, positive government intervention to control private sphere is required. Most obviously, the protection consists of punishment of private violence, but there is more to it than that. Just as the dissent complained, gay marriage is important because it provides affirmative government endorsement of relationships that were once scorned. It is a symbolic part of the project of tearing down the closet that hid individual gay Americans from view. It turns them into visible, public citizens worthy of public respect.
It is similarly fallacious to suppose that this transformation produces no externalities. Contrary to the claims its defenders must make to fit within our constitutional tradition, same-sex marriage decisions are not solely self-regarding. Of course, the assertion that straight people will no longer marry because gay people do is ludicrous, but the assertion that the end of the closet will have an impact on American culture is not. Does anyone suppose that one can shield oneself from the profound effects of television and computers on everyday life by not purchasing these products? These innovations transformed our entire society, whether one personally used them or not. So, too, the end of the closet affects all of us, gay or straight, in sometimes subtle but pervasive ways.
hatred so long as they do not violate the laws against their marital preferences. One could imagine that at some point in the future, polygamists would regain a group identity and solidarity that would make them more similar to gay men and lesbians. These are changes that can only be defended on the merits. The defense ultimately rests on the assertion that gay intimacy is a good and that suppression of it is an evil. Conventional constitutional argument lacks the resources to defend that assertion. There is not some neutral principle contained in the text of the Constitution or in a tradition that everyone is bound to accept that establishes its truth.
Instead, the truth comes from lived experience, from a sense of solidarity and empathy, and from the pull of fundamental decency -or at least so it seems to me. It will not seem that way to religious and cultural conservatives, who think that homosexuality offends the natural order. Anyone who supposes that constitutional law can bridge that gap misunderstands its nature and depth.
Truly respecting the losers in Obergefell entails recognizing that fact. We should not trivialize their objections by pretending that they are relying on an argument that we have forced them into making or by insisting that their actual argument is inconsistent with a neutral and objective reading of our founding document. The governors, attorney generals, and justices of the peace who resist Obergefell should not be told that they have a constitutional duty to comply regardless of the moral rightness of the decision. From their perspective, they have a duty to resist. What they should be told instead is that their perspective is wrong -at least from our perspective.
Of course, telling them this will not resolve the dispute, but neither should constitutional law. It is just a fact that our society is divided about questions that matter. If the divide is to be bridged at all, it will have to be by a sense of cooperation and solidarity that comes from engaging in a joint enterprise.
Vague words in an ancient text should not be allowed to do the trick.
III.
What to do?
No doubt, the governors, attorney generals, and justices of the peace will come around, albeit after some symbolic, short-lived unpleasantness. We are unlikely to see the kind of massive resistance that followed Brown or even the sustained political opposition that followed Roe. There are a variety of reasons for this acquiescence. Gay marriage does not disrupt an entrenched system in the way that Brown did. The Court did not embrace and, indeed, effectively isolated the strands of the gay rights movement that might have posed a challenge to the reigning ideology. Moreover, the decision does not provide the numerous possibilities for evasion that existed after both Brown and Roe. And whereas the country was narrowly divided about both desegregation and abortion, there is a large and growing majority favoring gay marriage.
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It must be conceded, though, that acquiescence also stems in part from a widespread belief that when the Supreme Court speaks in constitutional tones, its dictates appropriately settle the issue, at least until the decision is overruled. People who challenge the Court are said to be violating the rule of law and the Constitution itself, and many people think that that is a very bad thing.
The confluence of these forces has produced an undeniable, if partial and tainted victory. The day after Obergefell, there was indeed cause for dancing in the streets. People who had suffered years of exclusion and oppression finally achieved some recognition of their basic humanity. If Chief Justice
Roberts cannot bring himself to begrudge them their celebration, then neither can I.
Still, when the dancing stops, we are left with some disturbing questions. Constitutionalism helped produce a victory in this case, but it did so through mechanisms we should be ashamed of.
Should we embrace constitutionalism and use its tools so as to preserve this victory and, perhaps, win others as well? Put differently, if you or I were a justice on the Supreme Court, should we sign Justice Kennedy's opinion? What if our vote was necessary to secure a majority?
It is worth emphasizing again that the test for authentic constitutional obedience comes only when it produces bad outcomes. In this case, the outcome was good, and the substantive "rightness"
of Obergefell means that it cannot pose such a test, at least for those of us who believe that the outcome is substantively right. The real question, then, is whether the substantive rightness of this
See note x, supra.
particular outcome provides sufficient reason to associate ourselves with a discourse that is corrupt and obfuscatory.
That question is most difficult if one assumes that not just in this case, but over the range of cases, American constitutionalism produces or is likely to produce substantively good outcomes. There is a huge literature that I cannot do justice to here arguing that Court has only rarely stood for progressive social change and that, when it has attempted to do so, it has only rarely been successful.
Much more frequently, the justices have stood with the forces of reaction and privilege or backed down when confronted with opposition to progressive change.
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The gay rights story provides a partial corrective to this general narrative. The Court's decisions hastened the advent of gay marriage, and, for reasons I have just discussed, it seems quite likely that the reforms will stick. Still, even in this instance, judicial intervention was facilitated by exogenous social change that had little to do with constitutional litigation. By the time the Court finally got around to recognizing a right to gay marriage, the political and cultural isolation of gay men and lesbians was already quickly disappearing. It is probable that gay marriage would have been recognized almost everywhere within a decade or two even if the justices had not intervened. The Court's very gradual advance toward mandating gay marriage, extending over several decades, amounted to an admission that it felt unable to affect change until the point when its efforts were largely unnecessary.
Moreover, as argued above, the victory for gay marriage came at the cost of distorting the argument for and against it and further isolating others who do not live within the territory of empathy that the Supreme Court has bounded. And against the ambiguous and partial advance that protection for gay marriage represents, we must weigh all the unjust settlements that the Court and our sense of Gores, Hellers, and Citizens Uniteds. Is the game really worth the candle? I think that it probably is not, but that doesn't quite settle the matter. What if it is possible to use the tools of constitutionalism in bad faith to produce good results in this case while disowning them when they produce bad results in other cases? Should you or I then sign Justice Kennedy's opinion ?
There is a risk, of course, that we will be caught at this dishonest game or outsmarted by our opponents. Even if we are not, there are obvious problems of political morality at stake. If skillfully deployed, the tactic might marginally help produce a more substantively just society, but it does so only by removing from debate issues that ought to be contestable. There is no good reason grounded in political justice why people who disagree about, say, campaign finance, gun control, or gay marriage should be bound to put aside their principles and accept a particular judgment just because the Supreme Court thinks that the Constitution requires it. In place of these good reasons, constitutional law provides dishonesty, mystification, debate that has little relationship to what people do or should care about, and the false closure of authoritarian pronouncement. These characteristics of constitutionalism cannot be reconciled with the ideals of a mature, deliberative democracy. They do not accord our political opponents the dignity that they deserve.
If one would nonetheless sign Justice Kennedy's opinion, it must be because substantive justice trumps principles of political justice. It must be because those who are on the "right" side can appropriately insist on obedience for others that they would not accept for themselves. Is substantive justice the kind of trump that justifies this hypocrisy? I am far from certain, but I'm inclined to think that it is. Put differently, if I somehow found myself on the Supreme Court, yes, I would be tempted to join Justice Kennedy's dreadful opinion. On one side of the ledger, there is the real and daily human suffering resulting from the status quo. On the other side, it is not as if my abstaining from our constitutional practice means that others will as well. If
